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Summary In today’s Europe, the word ‘populism’ usually refers to right-wing populism or 
the populist extreme right. Is, however, the concept of ‘populism’ the proper theoretico-
political instrument through which such identifications should be perceived, categorized 
and debated? What are the implications (direct and indirect) of such a naming? And what 
are the risks for critical analysis and for democratic politics in the European context? The 
hypothesis explored in this essay is that sticking to a restrictive association between ‘po-
pulism’ and the extreme right poses certain dangers that have to be seriously taken into 
account, especially in times of crisis. For a start, it is often premised on a rather simplistic 
euro-centrism that reduces the broad conceptual spectrum covered by the category ‘po-
pulism’ in its global use to a very particular European experience and then essentializes 
the resulting association, over-extending its scope. In addition, the category ‘populism’ is 
often used to describe political forces, identities and discourses in which the role of ‘the 
people’ is only secondary or peripheral, to the extent that it has to coincide with strong-
ly hierarchical and elitist visions of society. What complicates things even further is that, 
within the context of the European (economic and political) crisis, whoever questions/
resists the austerity agenda – especially on the left – is increasingly discredited and de-
nounced as an irresponsible populist. Indeed, it is not by coincidence that doubts are in-
creasingly voiced both in the theoretical and in the political literature regarding the ra-
tionale behind such a strong association between populism and the extreme right. A 
series of points will thus be raised that may help us develop a plausible theoretico-politi-
cal strategy in the new emerging conditions from a discursive perspective.*
























The People and Populism
References to ‘the people’ are a con-
stant theme in political life. This is es-
pecially the case within the context of 
political modernity, where ‘popular so-
vereignty’ and ‘representation’ have re-
placed the ‘Divine Right of Kings’ as 
founding fictions permitting the sus-
pension of disbelief and the legitima-
tion of political order. Modern demo-
cracy, as Lincoln famously put it, entails 
the promise of ‘Government of the Peo-
ple, by the People and for the People’. 
Yet, already from its inception in the 
seventeenth century, ‘the sovereignty 
of the people had been filled with sur-
prises for those who invoked it. It was a 
more dynamic fiction than the one it re-
placed, more capable of serving as a goal 
to be sought, never attainable, always re-
ceding, but approachable and worth ap-
proaching’ (Morgan, 1988: 306). 
Indeed, one of the sources of this dy-
namism can be located in the constitu-
tive polysemy or even ambiguity of ‘the 
people’ in modern European languages: 
‘the people’ refers to both the totality of 
a given political community, to the citi-
zenry as a unitary body-politic (hence 
the numerous constitutional references 
to ‘We, the people...’), and, at the same 
time, designates ‘the poor, the under-
privileged and the excluded’ (Agamben, 
2004); in other words, the underdog 
marginalised from political participa-
tion and the enjoyment of political rights 
and socio-economic privileges. Simply 
put, ‘the people’ is simultaneously part 
and whole: ‘By immemorial tradition the 
term (like populus and demos before it) 
has meant both the whole political com-
munity and some smaller group within 
it; furthermore, while it has often hap-
pened that one group identified as “the 
people” was a political elite from which 
most were excluded, the term “people” 
has also been regularly used to denote 
the excluded lower orders’ (Canovan, 
2005: 5). 
Accordingly, ‘populism’ as a term 
usually refers to movements, parties and 
leaders claiming to represent the inter-
ests of ‘the people’ in this second sense of 
the term. Thus, populism invariably in-
volves some kind of opposition or revolt 
against the established structure of pow-
er as well as established values (Cano-
van, 1999: 3). However, like ‘the people’ 
itself – and although ‘populism’ has a 
long history within political theory and 
analysis – it nevertheless remains an es-
sentially contestable term, to the extent 
that no consensus exists on the particu-
lar operational criteria allowing the cate-
gorisation of a particular movement or 
discourse as populist or on the implica-
tions of such a categorisation. The pas-
sage from theory to empirical study and 
back is never easy, especially given the 
immense proliferation of populist phe-
nomena in contemporary global politics. 
Indeed, against the background of tradi-
tional populist mobilisations (Agrarian 
populism in the US, Russian Narodni-
chestvo and traditional Latin American 
populisms in the 1940s and 1950s – see 
Pedler, 1927; Di Tella, 1965; Ionescu & 
Gellner, 1969; Canovan, 1981; Kazin, 
1995; Creech, 2006; Luna, 2010), the last 
decades have signalled a resurgence of 
populist phenomena, especially in La-
tin America (Chavismo in Venezuela, 
Kirchnerismo in Argentina, etc. – see 
Gratius, 2007; Barrett, Chavez & Rod-
riguez-Garavito, 2008; Lievesley & Lud-
lam, 2009; Panizza, 2005, 2009; Sidicaro, 
2010) and, more recently, the US (where, 
ironically, both the Tea Party movement 


















pulists – see Ashbee, 2011; Etzioni, 2011; 
Pease, 2010; Savage, 2011; MacAskill, 
2012), not to mention aspects of the so-
called Arab Spring. 
Needless to say, Europe itself has not 
been left untouched, since it has wit-
nessed in its core the development of 
extreme right-wing populism in coun-
tries like France (Le Pen), Austria (Haid-
er) and elsewhere (De Vos, 2002; Bruff, 
2003; Mudde, 2007; Albertazzi & Mc-
Donnell, 2008; Berezin, 2009). Very re-
cently the Sarrazin incident has opened a 
critical debate in Germany about the pos-
sible emergence of a German right-wing 
populist movement; the Netherlands 
has also witnessed a long discussion on 
Geert Wilders’ extreme anti-Islamist, 
right-wing populism. Last but not least, 
Greece has recently been added to this 
list while still struggling with its own 
populist legacy (comprising very diverse 
manifestations, from PASOK’s left-wing 
populism in the 1980s to the religious 
populism of the late Archbishop Chris-
todoulos located in the turn of the 21st 
century – see Lyrintzis, 1987; Spourda-




At any rate, there is no doubt that 
in today’s Europe, the word ‘populism’ 
usually refers to right-wing populism 
or the populist extreme right. We are, 
of course, entitled – indeed obliged – to 
deal with this phenomenon, especially 
given its pan-European manifestations, 
about which many social scientists have 
contributed illuminating accounts and 
theorizations. Clearly, Walter Baier is 
right when, in a recent article, he points 
out that the problem should not be ap-
proached merely at the national level, 
since it seems to ‘indicate a profound 
change in the political geography of Eu-
rope as an entity’ (Baier, 2011: 128; see 
also Betz, 1994; Mudde, 2007). 
The question is how exactly to deal 
with this problem conceptually and po-
litically; in particular, is the category of 
‘populism’ the most suitable way? If, that 
is to say, what we are currently facing is 
the pan-European rise of a nationalist, 
xenophobic, exclusionist and, very of-
ten, violent extreme right (the cases of 
France, Hungary and Greece are indi-
cative), is the concept of ‘populism’ the 
proper theoretico-political instrument 
through which the problem should be 
perceived, categorized and debated? 
What are the implications (direct and 
indirect) of such a naming? And what 
are the risks for critical analysis and for 
democratic political strategy? 
My hypothesis is that sticking to a re-
strictive association between ‘populism’ 
and the extreme right poses certain 
dangers that have to be seriously taken 
into account, especially in times of cri-
sis. Indeed, it is not by coincidence that 
doubts are increasingly voiced both in 
the theoretical and in the political litera-
ture regarding the rationale behind such 
a strong association. Étienne Balibar is 
right to point out that today there is a 
divergence between those theorists and 
analysts for whom a populist movement 
is essentially ‘reactionary’ – this is the 
case not only in the ‘etymological’ sense 
that he mentions, but also in the political 
sense, which is equally important in our 
context – and those theorists 
for whom it brings back (even in a 
mystified, or destructive way) an ele-
ment of popular contestation of pow-
er, and resistance to the ‘de-democra-
tization’ of neo-liberal ‘democracies’, 
























politics becomes reduced to the tech-
nocratic ‘governance’ of social ten-
sions which are deemed both un-
avoidable and inessential (since they 
do not involve historical alternatives) 
(Balibar, 2011).
This is obviously a reference to the 
TINA (There Is No Alternative) dogma 
which is still dominant in many circles, 
including EU elites. And, of course, Bali-
bar’s comments do not emerge out of the 
blue, since this second camp has been 
gaining in credibility, theoretical sophis-
tication and analytical rigor in the last 
few years thanks to the innovative ap-
proaches to populism initiated by Er-
nesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Margaret 
Canovan, Jacques Rancière and others 
(see, for example, Laclau, 2005; Cano-
van, 1999; Rancière, 2007).
Theory: Problems and Solutions
These predominantly discursive/
structural approaches have, indeed, 
changed the landscape as far as the study 
of populism is concerned. Up to very re-
cently, the dominant trend in most re-
search conducted in this area (Germani, 
1978; Hahn, 1983; McMath, 1993; Hay-
ward, 1996; Albertazzi & McDonnell, 
2008; Hawkins, 2010; Cannon, 2010) 
has been to study populist mobilisations 
in different parts of the world separately, 
in (relative) isolation. The lack of a suf-
ficiently flexible yet rigorous theoretical 
and conceptual framework has resulted 
in the production of isolated case-stu-
dies employing diverse theoretical per-
spectives and methodologies, and thus 
forestalling the emergence of a compre-
hensive mapping and interpretation of 
populist politics at the global level. On 
the other hand, some brave attempts 
to articulate a more wide-ranging ap-
proach with ‘global’ pretensions have 
largely remained at a descriptive level, 
at best producing a variety of typologies 
of populism(s) on the basis of a check-
list of ‘symptoms’ (Wiles, 1969; Cano-
van, 1981, 1982; Taguieff, 1997; Taggart, 
2000). These symptoms include hos-
tility towards institutions, anti-elitism, 
an unmediated emphasis on the role 
of the leader, etc. No matter how use-
ful such classifications can be, they have 
been unable to integrate the ideal-types 
formulated on the way into a compre-
hensive framework with global reach, a 
framework that would be sensitive both 
to the historically specific experience of 
different countries and areas, and to the 
universal forces that determine identifi-
cation processes and identity formation. 
They have thus historically failed to pro-
duce operational definitions of popu-
lism, to illuminate what is unique to 
populism as a type of interpellation and 
an object of collective identification, and 
to clarify the relation between populism 
and democracy.1
Once more, the lack of a rigorous ne-
gotiation of the theory/analysis divide 
and the difficulty of arriving at a com-
monly acceptable and sufficiently flex-
ible definition of populism have led to 
rather poor results. It comes as no sur-
prise that almost all publications on 
populism, books and articles alike, share 
a rather pessimistic conclusion, stress-
ing the essential contestability of the 
concept as well as the stark differen-
ces between existing approaches to po-
1 What this picture underscores is that a tru-
ly comparative study of populist movements 
in their global manifestations (Sartori, 1991; 
Rose, 1991) must be guided by a flexible, yet 
thorough theoretical and conceptual appara-
tus, something that, as we shall see, a discur-


















pulism. As Margaret Canovan points 
out, although the term is frequent-
ly used, it remains exceptionally vague 
‘and refers in different contexts to a be-
wildering variety of phenomena’ (Cano-
van, 1981: 3). In fact, she even goes on 
to admit that it can be ‘doubted wheth-
er it could be said to mean anything at 
all’ (ibid.: 5). And this is not a conclusion 
confined to the 1980s; it is still the do-
minant view, as a recent Open Universi-
ty textbook on the concept of populism 
reveals: ‘Populism is a difficult, slippery 
concept’ (Taggart, 2000: 2). Needless to 
say, passing from academic reflection to 
public debate, conceptual confusion is 
further exacerbated by the distance be-
tween journalistic and social-scientific 
uses of the category. 
What can a discursive approach con-
tribute here (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Torf-
ing, 1999; Howarth, Norval & Stavraka-
kis, 2000; Howarth, 2000; Jorgensen 
& Phillips, 2002; Howarth & Torfing, 
2005)? Initiated by Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe, discourse theory – also 
known as the Essex School (Townshend, 
2003, 2004) – combines a theoretically 
sophisticated grasping of the processes 
through which social meaning is articu-
lated with an emphasis on the political 
and often antagonistic character that dif-
ferent discourses acquire through their 
articulation around distinct nodal points 
and their differentiation from other dis-
courses in a bid to hegemonise the public 
sphere and to influence decision-mak-
ing. Here, the term ‘discourse’ does not 
refer merely to words and ideas, but de-
notes all ‘systems of meaningful practi-
ces that form the identities of subjects and 
objects’ (Howarth, Norval & Stavrakakis, 
2000: 3-4) through the construction of 
antagonisms and the drawing of politi-
cal frontiers. Interestingly, populism has 
been, already from the 1970s, one of the 
main foci of Laclau’s discourse analysis 
(Laclau, 1977), to which he has recent-
ly devoted a monograph (Laclau, 2005 – 
see also his relevant debate with Zizek: 
Laclau, 2006; Zizek, 2006a, 2006b); it has 
also been a central priority in debates 
within the Essex School at large (Paniz-
za, 2005; Stavrakakis, 2004, 2005; Ardi-
ti, 2007). 
Approaches to populism elaborated 
within a discursive framework or influ-
enced by it, have indeed contributed a 
series of operational criteria promising 
to resolve the aforementioned analytical 
impasses. In particular, they highlight 
the importance of ascertaining wheth-
er a given discursive practice under exa-
mination is (a) articulated around the 
nodal point ‘the people’ or other (non-
populist or anti-populist) nodal points, 
and (b) to what extent the representa-
tion of society it offers is predominant-
ly antagonistic, dividing society into two 
main blocs: the establishment, the pow-
er bloc, vs. the underdog, ‘the people’ 
(in opposition to dominant political dis-
courses asserting the continuity and ho-
mogeneity of the social fabric and pri-
oritising non-antagonistic technocratic 
solutions). From this point of view, popu-
lism denotes neither a set of particular 
ideological contents nor a given organi-
sational pattern, but rather a discursive 
logic, a mode of representing social and 
political space which, no doubt, influ-
ences both these realms. Through the 
utilisation of such formal criteria, this 
discursive orientation offers the possi-
bility of developing rigorous typologies 
of populist movements, identities and 
discourses. Thus, the articulatory nature 
of populist discourses and the flexibili-
ty of populist ideological articulations, 
























can illuminate the paradox of antinomic 
formulations of populist ideology, from 
socialist-populist hybrids to be found in 
contemporary Latin America (Lievesley 
& Ludlam, 2009: 17; Panizza, 2009: 178) 
to the paradoxical elitist populism cha-
racteristic of extreme right-wing move-
ments in Europe (Caiani & Della Porta, 
2011: 198), and up to so-called ‘media 
populism’ (Mazzoleni et al., 2003; Eco, 
2007; Simons, 2011).
Such a flexible, yet rigorous concep-
tion of populism can also illuminate 
what still remains a major point of con-
tention in the ongoing debate: the am-
biguous relation between populism and 
democracy (Mény & Surel, 2002). On the 
one hand, the particular ways through 
which some populist movements articu-
late their claims to represent ‘the people’ 
– relying on charismatic leaders, fuelled 
by resentment, virtually bypassing the 
institutional framework of representa-
tive democracy and/or often contain-
ing an illiberal, anti-rights and national-
ist potential (Taggart, 2000) – need to be 
taken very seriously into account. And 
yet such a picture cannot exhaust the 
immense variety of populist articula-
tions. Indeed, by representing excluded 
groups, by putting forward an egalitar-
ian agenda, other types of populism – 
combining the formal populist core with 
the legacy of the radical democratic tra-
dition – can also be seen as an integral 
part of democratic politics, as a source 
for the renewal of democratic institu-
tions (Canovan, 1999). From this point 
of view, the more Western democracies 
turn to de-politicised forms of govern-
ance (to what Colin Crouch, Jacques 
Rancière and Chantal Mouffe call post-
democracy – see Mouffe, 2000; Crouch, 
2004; Rancière, 2007; Stavrakakis, 2007), 
the more populism will figure as a suit-
able vehicle available for a much-needed 
re-politicisation (Laclau, 2005). 
From Theory to Politics...
Let me now turn from theory to poli-
tics. In political discourse, precisely be-
cause of the aforementioned dominance 
of the association between ‘populism’ 
and the extreme right in the European 
context, the shift from a totally ‘nega-
tive’ to a more ambivalent/multiple/nu-
anced or even potentially ‘positive’ un-
derstanding of populism – a possibility 
indicated by a discursive approach – can 
take paradoxical forms. To start with a 
relatively graphic example, the intro-
ductory text in a recent Green Europe-
an Foundation publication on Populism 
in Europe begins with a depiction of po-
pulist movements as a force threatening 
‘the most fundamental European valu-
es’, denying ‘notions of diversity, open-
mindedness, critical (self)reflection and 
tolerance’ (Meijers, 2011: 5). Very quick-
ly, however, on the next page, some ele-
ments of contextualization and quali-
fication start to emerge: ‘Today, as we 
have seen, the concept is once again un-
dergoing transformation. The quest in 
this book is finding out what populism 
means today and how to deal with it. The 
description mentioned above serves as a 
starting point’ (ibid.: 6). 
Likewise, in their own text from the 
same collective volume, Daniel Cohn-
Bendit and Edouard Caudot start by il-
lustrating the current pan-European 
strengthening of populist parties and 
movements in very dark colours: ‘An 
unpleasant wind is blowing over Eu-
rope. The air is heavy and for the past 
few years, black thunderous clouds 
have been gathering over the continent’ 


















yet, their contribution ends with a posi-
tive endorsement of a progressive po-
pulism:
What is lacking in the fight against 
right-wing populism [...] is indeed 
a competing fantasy, an alterna-
tive culture, a discourse which deals 
with society’s frustrations. And, it is 
clear that since the end of the com-
munist and socialist utopias, the left 
has never managed to offer a similar 
alternative. [...] This is the challenge 
that the Greens and more broad-
ly all progressive forces face, if they 
truly desire to respond to the threat 
of right-wing populist tendencies. It 
is important to use that resentment 
and its energy, not directing this to-
wards a specific population, but 
channelling it in a positive way. [...] 
This obviously requires fundamen-
tal reforms, and perhaps even the re-
cognition, to quote Etienne Balibar, 
of a form of ‘positive populism’ that 
can secure the support of many. The 
project may well be long and un-
doubtedly complicated; but without 
it, reviving hope would be difficult 
(ibid.: 21-23).
To refer once more to Walter Baier, 
he has also formulated the challenge for 
the left in somewhat similar terms: ‘un-
doubtedly the question is complicated 
for the left. It must oppose the austeri-
ty policies of governments, the IMF and 
European institutions at the same time 
as it opposes the populisms which try 
to exploit them to foment nationalisms’ 
(Baier, 2011: 131, emphasis added).
Three Analytical Propositions
How can we effectively deal with all 
these challenges, paradoxes and com-
plications (both theoretical and politi-
cal)? Far from aspiring to resolve them, 
I would like to conclude with a series of 
points that may help us develop a plau-
sible theoretico-political strategy in the 
new emerging conditions, drawing on 
the discursive orientation briefly dis-
cussed.
1. Beyond Euro-centrism – Sim-
ply put, my main fear is that many of 
our analyses suffer from a certain eu-
ro-centrism that reduces the concep-
tual spectrum covered by the category 
‘populism’ in its global use to a very par-
ticular European experience – extreme 
right-wing xenophobic movements and 
parties – and then essentializes the re-
sulting association, over-extending the 
application of this contingent European 
meaning and elevating it into a univer-
sal and trans-historical criterion. It is, 
perhaps, time to take seriously into ac-
count the complexity and historical/po-
litical variability of populism(s) as well 
as its progressive potential, a potential 
most visibly present in contemporary 
Latin American experience (see, in this 
respect, Gratius, 2007; Barrett, Chavez 
& Rodriguez-Garavito, 2008; Lievesley 
& Ludlam, 2009; Panizza, 2005, 2009). 
Indeed, as Ernesto Laclau has put 
it, populism ‘is not a fixed constella-
tion but a series of discursive resources 
which can be put to very different uses’ 
(Laclau, 2005: 176). Citing Yves Surel, he 
concludes that: ‘Against the idea accord-
ing to which populism would represent 
a stable and coherent trend typical of the 
new radical Right, we want to defend 
the idea that it is less of a political fa-
mily than a dimension of the discursive 
and normative register adopted by poli-
tical actors’ (Surel in: Laclau, 2005: 176). 
Hence the immense plurality of popu-


























nistic/antagonistic, in the streets/in po-
wer, top-down/bottom-up, etc.
2. Euphemism versus Accuracy – 
I also think that, falling victims to the 
aforementioned over-extension, we of-
ten use the category ‘populism’ to de-
scribe political forces, actors and dis-
courses in which the role of ‘the people’ 
is only secondary or peripheral and 
where, in many cases, the reference is 
simply opportunistic. For example, isn’t 
it a euphemism – obeying a certain type 
of pro-European political correctness – 
to use ‘populist’ to refer to forces that are 
outright racist, chauvinist or even fascist 
or neo-Nazi? What seems to be needed 
is a willingness to move beyond such 
undue ‘politeness’ and apply a rigorous 
framework for the analysis and evalua-
tion of such political discourses. After 
all, this is the Dark Continent, as Mark 
Mazower has put it, and it should come 
as no surprise that such phenomena still 
flourish around us. 
Once more, a crucial test to help us 
in this exploration is offered by the dis-
cursive approach outlined above. Thus, 
we should always ask where reference 
to ‘the people’ is located within a given 
discourse: does it function as the nodal 
point, as a central point of reference? Or 
is it located at the periphery of the dis-
cursive structure under examination? If, 
to refer once more to Baier’s previously 
cited formulation, the aim of European 
right-wing populisms is ‘to foment na-
tionalisms’, then maybe we are dealing 
with primarily ‘nationalist’ discourses 
where references to ‘the people’ are only 
peripheral and/or secondary.2
2 It would be a mistake here to take ‘nation’ 
and ‘people’ as merely synonymous or always 
In fact, in addition to being of pe-
ripheral importance, ‘the people’ of the 
extreme right is often of a very particular 
type that creates considerable distance 
from the global populist canon. This is 
because it has to coincide with strongly 
hierarchical and elitist visions of society. 
In a recent extensive survey of extreme 
right-wing discourses in Italy and Ger-
many, Caiani and Della Porta have in-
deed observed that ‘the people’ are very 
often referred to: ‘They are defined as 
suffering from the misdeeds of the elite, 
and in need of protection by the extreme 
right itself ’. However, the prognosis here 
‘is not to return the power to the peo-
ple, but to advocate it to an exclusive 
(more or less heroic) elite’, something of-
ten missed in the mainstream euro-cen-
tric analyses of populism (Caiani & Del-
la Porta, 2011: 197). This clearly points 
to ‘some tensions in the conceptualiza-
tion of populism when applied to the ex-
treme right’ (ibid.: 198).
At best, then, references to ‘the peo-
ple’ constitute a secondary moment in 
the extreme right discursive articula-
tion – but it can also be an opportunistic 
rhetorical strategy definitely inadequate 
to provide these movements with a pro-
per name. Ironically, mainstream par-
ties know that already; they are already 
aware that the extreme right is gene-
rally not very serious about ‘the people’. 
This is why, for example, when such po-
articulated in the same way. This is most 
clearly shown in the many instances where 
political antagonism leads to their ideologi-
cal articulation in opposite camps or radical-
ly transforms their meaning; recent examples 
include Mélenchon’s populism against Le 
Pen’s nationalism (Papadatos, 2012), as well 
as the new inclusive definition of the ‘peo-



















litical forces are needed to form a coa-
lition government, mainstream parties 
approach them by offering concessions 
on other aspects of their agenda (usually 
the xenophobic ones), and not on their 
alleged populism. This is also why, when 
such offers are made, extreme right-
wing forces are often more than happy 
to ‘betray’ their ‘people’ in the first op-
portunity. 
It is obviously important to note that 
extreme right parties often manage ‘to 
force their agenda onto other political 
parties, including the social-democra-
tic parties, but also conquer key posi-
tions in terms of government formation’ 
(Baier, 2011: 130). But why is it the case 
that this agenda very rarely includes the 
populist aspect of their ideology/rheto-
ric? We have recently witnessed a very 
revealing example of that process in 
Greece, with the participation of LAOS 
– an extreme right populist party – in 
the formation of the so-called ‘national 
unity’ coalition government encouraged 
by the European Union and the IMF to 
implement austerity measures (Novem-
ber 2011). As a result, this party gained 
mainstream status; however, it lost al-
most overnight its populist appeal and, 
within a few months, both its elector-
al basis and its parliamentary represen-
tation (elections of May & June 2012). 
Doesn’t that reveal something about 
the nature of its populism? At the same 
time, of course, it also reveals something 
about the nature of the despotic trans-
formation of the EU itself – just compare 
the reactions to Haider’s participation in 
the Austrian government a few years ago 
with the absence of any reaction to this 
particular incident.
3. Populism, Anti-populism and 
Crisis – I just mentioned the implemen-
tation of austerity policies in Greece 
within the context of the European (eco-
nomic and political) crisis, and this 
brings me to my last and final point.
I think it is obvious – at least from 
the perspective of certain countries of 
the European South or the EU periph-
ery like Greece – that the crisis increas-
ingly puts in doubt the central ideolo-
gical narrative according to which the 
main struggle is one between a primar-
ily ‘good’ Europe and a series of ‘bad’ ex-
treme right-wing populisms. As we have 
also seen in the discussion of the col-
lective volume published by the Greens 
earlier on, populism is primarily depict-
ed as threatening ‘the most fundamental 
European values’. I am very much won-
dering whether this schema is still capa-
ble of capturing the unfolding of politi-
cal and ideological struggles in times of 
crisis, especially in the EU periphery. In 
other words, what if Europe, and I mean 
dominant European institutions, is no 
longer guided by these European values, 
values like democracy and popular so-
vereignty? Here, the ill-fated initiative by 
ex-prime minister of Greece George Pa-
pandreou to hold a referendum, which 
was instantly and rather brutally sup-
pressed by Merkel, Sarkozy and the 
EU leadership during the Cannes G-20 
summit (3-4 November 2011), is quite 
revealing, as Jürgen Habermas and Ul-
rich Beck were quick to point out (see 
Habermas, 2011a; Beck, 2011).3 It sig-
nalled, in their view, a despotic, post-
democratic mutation of the EU. What if, 
within the framework of what Christo-
pher Lasch has famously phrased as ‘the 
revolt of the elites and the betrayal of 
democracy’ (Lasch, 1995), post-demo-
cratic Europe is more than willing to 
3 This is the case irrespective of Papandreou’s 
























embrace the inclusion of extreme right 
parties in governments provided they 
help in the ‘dirty job’ of pushing through 
austerity? My fear is that, increasingly, 
to quote Balibar, instead of being part 
of the solution, this particular version of 
‘Europe, as it stands, has become “part of 
the problem”’ (Balibar, 2011). 
What complicates things even fur-
ther, and should be taken into account 
urgently, is that, at the same time, who-
ever resists the austerity agenda – espe-
cially on the left – is discredited and de-
nounced as an irresponsible populist. The 
Greek experience is, once more, illumi-
nating in this respect: without any exag-
geration, what has lately emerged as the 
central discursive/ideological cleavage 
in Greek politics is the opposition be-
tween populist and anti-populist ten-
dencies, where the accusation of ‘po-
pulism’ is used to discredit any political 
forces resisting austerity measures and 
defending democratic and social rights.4 
In this sense, our age is marked by a new 
twist in the complex language games de-
veloped around ‘the people’ and ‘popu-
lism’, something partly due to the glo-
bal financial crisis. This is especially the 
case in Europe, where the crisis has so far 
failed to produce institutional alterna-
tives in mainstream political arenas (in 
contrast to what happened, for example, 
in Latin America, irrespective of how 
one is to evaluate this difference). What 
it has produced, nevertheless, is the pro-
liferation of new types of ‘anti-populist’ 
discourses aiming at the discursive po-
4 See, in this respect, the presentations and 
debates during the two-day conference on 
‘Populism, anti-populism and democra-
cy’ organized by the Aristotle University of 
Thessaloniki on 27-28 January 2012: http://
www.anti-pop.gr
licing and the political marginalisation 
of emerging protest movements against 
the politics of austerity (for example, the 
so-called Indignant movement), espe-
cially in countries such as Greece, Spain, 
Portugal, etc. As Serge Halimi has re-
cently pointed out, ‘[a]nyone who criti-
cizes the privileges of the oligarchy, the 
growing speculation of the leading clas-
ses, the gifts to the banks, market libera-
lization, cuts on wages with the pre-
text of competitiveness, is denounced 
as “populist” who “plays the game of ex-
treme right”’ (Halimi, 2011). As Rancière 
had already highlighted, here populism 
seems to be the ‘convenient name’ under 
which the denunciation and discredit-
ing of alternatives legitimizes the claim 
of economic and political elites to ‘gov-
ern without the people’, ‘to govern with-
out politics’ (Rancière, 2007: 80). What 
it also means is that we should, perhaps, 
always keep in mind that whenever the 
term ‘populist’ is used in a fortuitous 
way, in a non-rigorous way, associat-
ing it with something by definition ex-
tremist, racist or even fascist, a collateral 
damage is taking place: we are indirectly 
and unwillingly strengthening the abili-
ty of dominant discourses to demonize 
popular resistance to the austerity ava-
lanche.5 Thus political analysis becomes 
an Ideological State Apparatus par excel-
lence, to remember Louis Althusser.
This strategy of demonization, 
which is dominating mainstream politi-
cal and media discourse, does not tar-
get ‘populism’ – and I now mean left-
wing populism – by coincidence. It is 
5 This has also been increasingly the case with 
mainstream reactions to Mélenchon’s ap-
pealing discourse in France (see, for exam-



















out there for everyone to see that if an 
alternative agenda is to hegemonise the 
political field at the national and Eu-
ropean levels, if it is to attract the mid-
dle-class strata currently experiencing 
a violent spiral of downward social mo-
bility, it can only do so by investing on 
empty signifiers like ‘the people’ – it is 
this potent alternative which is current-
ly demonized. Hence, the task ahead, at 
least in my view, would be to cautiously 
welcome the development of a real de-
bate around progressive/positive/inclu-
sive populisms, reclaiming ‘the people’ 
from extreme right-wing associations 
and re-activating its constitutive ambi-
guity marking the democratic legacy of 
political modernity. If the last, the high-
est stage of economic/neoliberal Eu-
ropeanization is some sort of enforced 
neocolonial Europeanization by ‘shock 
and awe’, then it is no coincidence that this 
process produces new popular/populist 
identities of resistance and consolidates 
a new cleavage between populist and 
anti-populist forces in crisis-ridden Eu-
rope. European political science should 
urgently and properly register this un-
folding dialectic without loosing sight of 
its complexity, simultaneously avoiding 
the Eurocentric and euphemistic traps 
and engaging with cutting-edge discur-
sive/structural approaches to both po-
pulism and anti-populism.
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SAŽETAK  U današnjoj Europi riječ “populizam” obično povezujemo s desnim populizmom 
i populističkom ekstremnom desnicom. No je li koncept populizma ispravan političko-teo-
rijski koncept na temelju kojeg se takve identifikacije trebaju percipirati, kategorizirati te 
o njima raspravljati? Koje su (izravne i neizravne) implikacije takve identifikacije? Hipote-
za koju ovaj rad istražuje glasi da restriktivno povezivanje koncepta populizma s ekstre-
mnom desnicom vodi do određenih teškoća koje treba ozbiljno uzeti u obzir, posebno u 
kontekstu postojeće ekonomske krize. Prvo, takvo povezivanje počiva na eurocentrizmu 
koji širok konceptualni spektar što ga koncept populizma pokriva u svojoj globalnoj pri-
mjeni svodi na veoma specifično europsko iskustvo. Uz to, koncept populizma često se 
rabi da bi se opisale političke sile, identiteti i diskursi u kojima je uloga “naroda” sekundar-
na ili periferna, što vodi prema izuzetno hijerarhijskoj i elitističkoj slici društva. Stvari do-
datno komplicira to što se u kontekstu europske ekonomske i političke krize svakoga tko 
se protivi ili dovodi u pitanje politiku štednje – posebno na ljevici – proglašava i diskrediti-
ra kao neodgovornog populista. Nije slučajno što se u teorijskoj, ali i političkoj literaturi sve 
više javlja sumnja u opravdanost povezivanja populizma i ekstremne desnice. Bit će ponu-
đeno nekoliko argumenata koji nam mogu pomoći da iz perspektive teorije diskursa raz-
vijemo plauzibilnu teorijsko-političku strategiju koja može odgovoriti na te izazove.
KLJUČNE RIJEČI  populizam, Europa, diskurs, ekstremna desnica, kriza
